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This paper introduces a strategy for modeling the exchange rate when the monetary autho-
rity targets inflation while also managing the exchange rate using interventions. It does 
so in the framework of a standard reduced-form New Keynesian model of monetary trans-
mission used in many institutions for research, forecasting, and monetary policy analysis. 
We propose a micro-founded modification to the UIP condition which allows for model-
ing of informal exchange rate bands. Our modeling strategy is useful for most hybrid IT 
regimes, including those with imperfect control over market interest rates. 
1. Introduction 
The modeling of transmission mechanisms when the monetary authority ope-
rates inflation targeting (IT) as well as managing the exchange rate is an important 
issue for many central banks. The mix of a fixed exchange rate and an IT regime 
calls for adequate forecasting and modeling capacities, similar to those required by 
full fledged IT. 
Various central banks are in need of such forecasting capacities. For instance, 
there are countries with a fixed or strongly managed exchange rate which are con-
templating a gradual transition towards a more flexible exchange rate regime. Exam-
ples include Botswana, Belarus, Egypt, and Ukraine, among others. Although they 
peg their currencies either to a single foreign currency or to a basket of international 
currencies, they are simultaneously attempting to implement elements of inflation 
targeting by controlling the deviation of inflation from the target through adjustments 
to short-term interest rates. 
At the same time, there are IT (or close-to-IT) countries with a flexible ex-
change rate that have gradually approached an exchange rate peg within the ERM II 
framework (Slovakia, for instance) or will do so in the future, such as the Czech Repub-
lic. The Czech Republic’s almost free float
1 will in future be constrained by the ERM II 
mechanism with a fluctuation band, only to be entirely removed on joining the EMU 
later on. The freedom of the central bank to choose targets and interest rates to 
achieve those targets will thus gradually be reduced. 
* The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be in-
terpreted as reflecting the views of the institutions they represent or any other person associated with 
them. 
1 See (Geršl, Holub, 2006) for a discussion of exchange rate interventions undertaken recently by the Czech 
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Such  a modeling  capacity  is  useful  for  other  countries,  too,  as t h e   p heno-
menon of the coexistence of IT with some kind of exchange rate  management is 
present in many IT countries, at least informally. Many of them, at times, attempt to 
control excessive exchange rate fluctuations by interventions of various forms (e.g., 
sterilization of inflows). Some of them (e.g., Hungary until recently) even recognize 
two explicit targets: in terms of exchange rate and inflation bands.  
Indeed, the two intermediate targets are not incompatible (e.g., Mishkin and 
Savastano (2001)). In theory, there is no difference between inflation and exchange 
rate targeting, as long as the targets are defined consistently with each other. It is 
the practice of the two regimes that marks the difference. In pegged regimes, cent-
ral banks are punished for mistakes in assessing economic fundamentals (such as 
the equilibrium real exchange rate) by the financial markets, which act swiftly and 
whose force is hard to balance. On the other hand, mistakes in IT regimes are pu-
nished by consumers (and the public in general) through expectations, which evolve 
only gradually. In practice, monetary policy makers have many more opportunities to 
correct their mistakes when targeting inflation rather than the exchange rate. For IT, 
it is enough for the policy to be correct on average, whereas for a peg, a single mis-
take can have devastating consequences. 
This paper introduces a strategy for modeling exchange rate behavior when 
the monetary authority attempts to control both the exchange rate and the inflation 
rate, each with a different instrument: inflation with interest rates and the exchange 
rate through interventions.
2 It does so in the framework of a simple reduced-form New 
Keynesian (NK) model of monetary transmission, as used in many institutions for 
research, forecasting, and monetary policy analysis. 
Our strategy differs from other approaches that combine IT with partial con-
trol over the exchange rate, in that it uses the exchange rate as an operational rather 
than an intermediate target. The exchange rate thus complements the interest rate as 
a monetary policy instrument rather than inflation as an intermediate target (as in 
(Parrado, 2004a), for instance). This is a more relevant approach in cases where con-
trol  over  money  market  interest  rates  is  not  yet  perfectly  established,  or  where 
changing interest rates is for some reason insufficient to achieve the intermediate 
inflation target and the central bank resorts to interventions. In addition to pure IT, 
our strategy encompasses the hybrid IT regimes of informal exchange rate corridors, 
pegged or crawling exchange rates, and imperfect control over market interest rates. 
We keep our analysis technical and avoid discussing its policy  or country 
implications. Although we model a variety of regimes, we do so by modifying one 
equation (UIP) in an otherwise standard model with a given parameterization. In 
these experiments, we do not attempt to model a particular country, and many of our 
comparisons are subject to the Lucas critique, because we do not change the model 
parameterization for different exchange rate regimes. Nevertheless, we believe these 
comparisons will be useful for modelers seeking particular model properties. 
Despite the absence of policy discussions in this text, our strategy is useful for 
modeling many hybrid IT regimes. It encompasses IT with informal (unannounced) 
2 Interventions are often used as a tool to control exchange rate volatility even in IT regimes; see, for
example, (Geršl, Holub, 2006). For a summary of central bank interventions in emerging economies, as
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exchange rate bands, crawling bands, as well as regimes with imperfect control over 
both exchange and interest rates. The only regimes our analysis is not useful for 
tackling are those with explicit (announced) exchange rate bands, whose disciplining 
effect on exchange rate behavior cannot be captured in a simple linear New Keyne-
sian model. 
The paper first discusses why modeling of an exchange rate managed through 
interventions (as opposed to interest rate changes) is more relevant in the institutional 
setting of many economies. It then introduces the canonical New Keynesian model of 
monetary transmission and explains the problems created by pure UIP for the model 
properties. In the next section, a modification of the UIP is proposed, one that is con-
sistent with empirical findings on UIP and that can be linked to a systematic inter-
vention policy of a central bank. It is shown how the modified equation can be 
calibrated to achieve a particular degree of exchange rate flexibility (through a pro-
babilistic exchange rate band). Finally, the model is extended to encompass other 
hybrid IT cases, including those involving both exchange and interest rate corridors. 
The last section presents conclusions. The appendix explains in more detail the extre-
me case of an IT regime based on interest rate policy under an exchange rate peg. 
2. Institutional Setting 
The coexistence of inflation targeting and exchange rate management can be 
achieved in two institutionally different ways, each with different modeling implica-
tions. In one, the monetary authority affects the exchange rate solely through manipula-
tion of interest rates, and the exchange rate then responds to interest rate differentials 
according to the interest rate parity arbitrage condition. In the other, the authority 
conducts exchange interventions independently of interest rate management, violating 
the interest rate parity arbitrage condition if necessary. 
In reality, both practices are common and are often used concurrently. For in-
stance, interest rates in Hungary (which explicitly followed both exchange and infla-
tion targets until recently) were set so that the exchange rate did not escape its band. 
Were the exchange to escape the band, however, the central bank woul have interven-
ed to fulfill the exchange rate target. In other cases as well, interventions are supported 
by dramatic changes in interest rates to preserve exchange rate targets (whether expli-
cit or implicit), as happened, for instance, during the speculative attacks on the ERM  
in 1992. 
The two practices have different modeling requirements. When the exchange 
rate is managed through interest rates simultaneously with inflation, the monetary 
authority has to consider both inflation and exchange rates in its interest rate rule as 
intermediate targets. Less flexible exchange rate regimes are represented by a high 
weight on the deviation of the exchange rate from the desired level, as in (Parrado, 
2004a) or (Natalucci, Ravenna, 2002). The exchange rate itself is then modeled via 
the conventional  uncovered  interest  rate parity  (UIP)  arbitrage r elationship,  and 
the exchange rate fluctuations remain confined by the appropriate management of 
policy rates. 
Modeling of the situation where both the exchange rate and the interest rate 
are  managed  independently  is  more  challenging  and  not  well  explored  in  the li-
terature. In such case, interest rates are set with respect to the inflation target, while 
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the flexibility of the exchange rate regime). As a special case, both the interest rate 
and the exchange rate may be used as independent instruments in targeting inflation. 
Although modeling of both practices is important, this paper focuses only on 
exchange rate management through interventions and not through interest rates. This 
is for three reasons. First, managing the exchange rate via interest rates does not 
allow for simultaneous functioning of fixed exchange rate and IT regimes, because 
interest rate arbitrage sets interest rates at the parity implied by foreign interest rates. 
Second, the case of targeting the exchange rate through interest rates is relatively 
well developed in the literature (see (Parrado, 2004a), or (Natalucci, Ravenna, 2002)). 
Finally, using interest rates in targeting the exchange rate is not an adequate tool for 
modeling the coexistence of IT and managed exchange rates. The latter requires 
handling of interventions and (at least periodic) violation of the interest rate parity 
condition. This is consistent with the literature (e.g. (Krugman, 1991), and (Sarno, 
Taylor,  2001)),  which  finds  that  the exchange  rate  bands  act  as a   s i gnal  altering 
the sensitivity of the exchange rate to its fundamentals (i.e., in this case the interest 
rate differential). 
3. The Canonical New Keynesian Model of Monetary Transmission 
In this section we present the canonical reduced-form New Keynesian model 
that is widely used for forecasting and policy analysis in central banks and other in-
stitutions, such as the IMF.
3 A more detailed description, including the rationale be-
hind the model equations, can be found, for instance, in (BulíĜ, Hurník, 2006), who 
used a similar model for analysis of disinflation costs in several EU member coun-
tries, as well as Berg, Laxton, and Karam in (BKL, 2006a and 2006b). 
3.1 The Standard Model with Pure UIP 
To motivate our work, we start by presenting the canonical model in the form 
suitable for a full-fledged IT country that leaves the exchange rate to float freely. Ac-
cordingly,  we  model  the exchange  rate  using  a purely  forward-looking  uncovered 
interest rate parity condition (UIP). Later in this section we modify the exchange rate 
equation in a way allowing for certain persistence in exchange rate movement, as 
proposed by Beneš, Vávra, and Vlþek (BVV, 2002). These serve as a background for 
the discussion of exchange rate management in the following sections. 
The canonical model consists of six behavioral equations that represent aggre-
gate demand, aggregate supply, imported goods inflation, the uncovered interest rate 
parity condition, the term structure, and the policy-reaction function.
4 In addition, se-
veral identities are present. As it is not our intention to calibrate or estimate the model 
based on data available for any particular country, the model parameterization (i.e., 
the model coefficients) simply follows reasonable values that may be found in the re-
levant literature. 
Aggregate demand, aggregate supply, and the equation for imported goods 
inflation take the following form:  
3 See (Berg, Laxton, Karam, 2006a) and (2006b) for the reference. 
4 Berg, Laxton, and Karam in (2006a) and (2006b) propose an even simpler version of the model con-
sisting of four equations only. Unlike in our model here, the equations for imported goods inflation and 
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  represent the deviations of actual output, the real interest 
rate, the real exchange rate, and foreign output from their respective non-inflationary 
(natural) levels, 




 ,  t S
, and 
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t S  stand for domestic, expected (model-consis-
tent), foreign, and imported goods inflation, and  z '  and  t s '  represent changes in 
the trend real and nominal exchange rates. Structural shocks are denoted by İ. The va-
riables are in logs, except for interest  rates. 
The policy rule and the term structure are represented as 
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where  t i  represents the policy (and market) short-term rate,  r  is the trend short-term 
real interest rate, 
T S  is the inflation target, and  t I  is the long-term (one-year) nomi-
nal interest rate.
5 
Finally, the UIP equation is  
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where 
t s  is the nominal exchange rate at time t, 
1 t s
  is its model-consistent expecta-
tions, and 
t i
 is the foreign nominal (short-term) interest rate. The interest rate diffe-
rential between domestic and foreign short (3M) interest rates 
tt ii
   is quoted in 
annual terms. prem is the premium required by investors for holding domestic se-
curities. 
The model further consists of several identities and transformations:  
1
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5 The rule reacts to the deviation in the quarterly inflation rate from the targe one period ahead. More ty-
pical formulations involve reactions to a year-on-year inflation rate from the target several periods ahead. 
We chose this formulation because it is more parsimonious (introducing year-on-year inflation would add 
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where 
t r is the short-term real interest rate, 
* r  is the foreign trend real interest rate, and 
ǻ
t z  is the change in the real exchange rate. In our notation, bars denote (potential- 
ly  exogenous)  trend  values  of  model  variables  with  the property t h at  tt lim x of    
tt lim x , x of    For instance,  t z  is an exogenous trajectory of the real exchange rate 
trend. The model implies by construction that  tt zz    in the steady state. 
In calibrating the model we choose plausible parameter values that may cor-
respond to an emerging market economy with strong nominal and real exchange 
rate transmission channels. Table 1 gives a perspective of the chosen parameter va-
lues using BKL’s general suggestions and their choice for Canada. Our parameter 
values differ from those for Canada to better reflect an emerging marking eco-
nomy:  
 – First, the effect of the real exchange rate on the output gap (parameter  3 a ) is much 
stronger than that for Canada and exceeds the strength of the real interest rate effect 
on output ( 2 a ). This reflects a much stronger real exchange rate effect on output in 
many emerging market economies, whose underdeveloped financial  markets  and 
high financial dollarization often reduce the relative strength of the real interest 
rate  channel  (see,  for  example,  (Armas,  Grippa,  2006),  for  the case  of  Peru). 
Moreover, in economies that peg their currencies, medium-term stability comes 
from fluctuations in relative prices (real exchange rates) and not real interest rates.  
TABLE 1  Parameters of the Canonical Model 




1 a 0.7 0.5–0.9  0.85 
2 a 0.1 - 0.1
3 a 0.2 - 0.05 
23  aa 0.3 0.1–0.2  0.15 
4 a 0.3 - 0.25 
1 b 0.65  > 0.5  0.8
2 b 0.25  - 0.1
3 b 0.5 - 0.3
1 c 0.8 - -
1 d 0.8 0.5–1  0.5
2 d 2.5 - 2.0
3 d 0.5 - 0.5172                                Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 3-4 
 – Second, output in our model is less persistent and more dependent on the external 
economy than that of Canada (parameters  1 a  and  4 a ).  
 – Third, the nominal exchange rate pass-through to inflation is much stronger and 
faster in our model than in the Canadian calibration. Parameter  2 b , which mea-
sures the immediate pass-through, is more than twice as high as that for Canada. 
In the model simulation of an exchange rate shock (see later),  almost  20 % of 
the shock is passed to prices within one quarter and the transmission is complete 
within about a year and a half.  
 – Fourth, the output gap effect on inflation ( 3 b ) is much higher in our calibration to 
reflect the relatively low costs of disinflation in many emerging market economies. 
Our  model  was  calibrated  so  that  the sacrifice  ratio  (measuring t h e   c umulative 
output  loss needed for  a sustained  disinflation  of  1  p.p.)  is  below  1, which  is 
standard for many emerging market economies.  
These parameter choices affect the model business cycle properties (transition 
dynamics), but are not central to our main derivations and conclusions. Although 
the impulse responses and other simulations performed later in the paper are specific 
to the parameter values chosen, the general lessons we draw are not affected by the par-
ticular parameter choice.  
Crucial to our analysis are the long-term (steady state) properties of the ca-
nonical model, which are independent of the parameter choices. The model is con-
structed so that  monetary neutrality holds, i.e., there is no long-term relationship 
between  nominal  and  real  variables,  or  their  growth  rates.  In  our  notation,  this 
implies the following steady state properties (no time subscripts indicate steady state 
values of the variables): 
T S SS                                                       (13) 
   zz '  ' 
    t tt t ss z S S
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On  the other hand,  the levels  of  the nominal  exchange rate  and  prices  in 
the steady state (or along a balanced growth path, BGP)
6 are not uniquely defined, 
because they follow stochastic trends, i.e., they can take any value depending on 
the shocks hitting the model economy and the initial conditions. 
In the simulations below, 
* S , 
* ˆ y , and 
* r  as well as  ǻz , prem, and 
T S  are as-
sumed to equal zero for the sake of exposition (without affecting the generality of our 
conclusions). 
3.2 Problems with Pure UIP 
This standard New Keynesian model with pure UIP as in (6) is difficult to 
calibrate to achieve reasonable properties in terms of impulse  responses, because 
the exchange rate has little persistence. Figures 1 to 3 show the exchange rate and 
interest rate impulse responses for three standard shocks: demand, supply, and ex-
change rate (
y
t H ,  t
S H , 
s
t H ). 
6 We use steady state and BGP interchangeably. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 3-4                                173 
 
The pure forward-looking UIP makes the exchange rate jump from period to 
period. For instance, in Figure 1 the exchange rate appreciates on impact in response 
to increased policy rates and then starts to depreciate to reach its new steady state 
level. The erratic exchange rate behavior is due to the forward-looking element in (6). 
It makes the current exchange rate level immediately adjust to the sum of all future 
interest rate differentials implied by the model behavior.  
FIGURE 1  Demand Shock 
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Source: own calculation 
 
FIGURE 2  Inflation Shock 
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Such exchange rate behavior is often inconsistent with the stylized facts. It 
also distorts monetary policy transmission, complicating the interpretation of the shock 
dynamics using the model mechanisms and thus reducing the usefulness of the model 
for policy analysis. This is a problem especially when modeling transmission in emerg-
ing market economies, where the direct exchange rate channel often has a dominant 
role and good calibration of that channel is essential for the successful use of any 
structural model.  
The poor performance of pure UIP in structural models is related (but not equi-
valent) to the failure of empirical tests of the UIP. The so-called Fama regressions 
reject the UIP overwhelmingly, especially at short horizons (Fama, 1984), (Engels, 
1996). The literature ascribes most of the deviations between the UIP and the observ-
ed ex post behavior of the exchange rate to expectation errors rather than a country 
risk premium (Campbell, 1997), (Froot, Frankel, 1989). Many hypotheses have been 
put forward to explain the serial correlation of expectation errors needed to reconcile 
the evidence with the theory (Engel, Mark, West, 2007). Among them, the so-called 
“peso  problem”  and  a sudden  shift  in  the monetary  regime  have  been  most  pro-
minent.
7   
Modelers have been trying to address the issue of low exchange rate persisten-
ce by modifying the pure UIP, mostly by reducing the extent of its forward-looking 
nature. This approach substitutes the model-consistent exchange rate expectations in (6) 
by a combination of backward and model-consistent expectations. This is the tactic 
used by BKL and BVV, among others.
8 The BVV case is more general than the BKL 
FIGURE 3  Exchange Rate Shock 
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Source: own calculation 
7 N ote  that  calibration  problems  with  pure  UIP  also  arise  in  the full  structural  model  that  addresses 
the misspecification issue of reduced-form Fama regressions. Indeed, the structural model in this section 
does offer more options for describing exchange and interest rate behavior than the reduced-form Fama 
regressions, as seen in Figures 1–3. Nevertheless, pure UIP still causes large problems as regards cali-
brating the model to the stylized facts. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 3-4                                175 
one, as it allows for non-zero growth of the exchange rate along the balanced growth 
path.
9 BVV postulate exchange rate expectations as a weighted average of model-con-
sistent and myopic expectations that are consistent with the model behavior of the ex-
change rate in the long term:  
 11 1 (2 ) 1
e
t tt t s ss s EE     '                                 (15) 
where 
         t tt t s z S S
 '   '                                             (16) 
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or                tt t t sz S S
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The first element in brackets in (15) is the myopic exchange rate expectations, 
which project the exchange rate in period t + 1 as an extrapolation of the past ex-
change rate using the trend growth rate of the real exchange rate and the inflation 
differential. 
Such expectations are myopic (i.e., model-inconsistent) in the short term, but 
are consistent with rational model-based expectations in the long term, They, there-
fore, correspond to the empirical research that finds the UIP holding at long horizons. 
The term  t s '  is the change in the exchange rate consistent with long-term economic 
fundamentals represented by the inflation targets and the real exchange rate trend. By 
construction,  tt s s '  ' in the steady state, so the steady state properties in (13) are 
intact. 
There are various interpretations of this myopic exchange rate  expectation 
term. The most intuitive is that it reflects the exchange rate expectations of financial 
market analysts, who have a view of the long-term economic potential (represented 
by the trend real exchange rate appreciation of  t z ' ) and adjust it for inflation dif-
ferentials, current, expected or long-term (represented by inflation targets). This needs 
to be done for two periods, as the analysts project the exchange rate from period t – 1 
to period t + 1, hence the factor of 2. An equivalent interpretation is that it reflects 
the view of an analyst who has a simple monetarist model in mind, in which relati- 
ve PPP holds when adjusted for the real exchange rate trend. In such a paradigm 
(which also holds in the steady state of our model), higher inflation inevitably leads 
to a weaker exchange rate, ceteris paribus. Finally, a technical interpretation is that 
such a formulation of myopic expectations is the only one with a backward-looking 
exchange rate ( 1 t s  ) that is at the same time consistent with non-zero growth of the no-
minal exchange rate in the steady state. 
Note that there are various possible definitions of  t s '  All are consistent with 
the long-term model properties, but each has different short-term implications.
10 Al-
8 (Adolfson, Lasen, Linde, Villani, 2007) is another recent example of a UIP modification to introduce 
persistency into the exchange rate dynamics using an approach similar to, but less general than, BVV. 
9 In addition, BKL is more cumbersome, as it uses the UIP defined in real exchange and interest rates. 
10 There are other specifications belonging to the same class, such as those that rewrite each step in pro-
jecting the future exchange rate separately using the values for inflation and the real exchange rate trend of 
the particular period, e.g.:   1 11 1 () 1 e
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though BVV use (17), all three definitions belong to the same category of UIP mo-
difications. In the remaining text and simulations we will only use the first formu-
lation in (16), because it is more convenient for modeling exchange rate corridors 
later on. However, our results can easily be re-interpreted using the other formu-
lations. 
The BVV UIP modification is useful, because it reduces the short-term jum-
piness  of  the exchange  rate  and  thus helps us  to  achieve  more  reasonable  model 
properties in terms of impulse responses and the fit to the stylized facts. It is clear 
that the inclusion of the past exchange rate  1 t s   makes the exchange rate more persis-
tent. Figures 1 to 3 contrast the impulse responses of the pure UIP model with those 
of the BVV UIP model, showing more persistence in the exchange rate behavior of 
the latter. An additional advantage of the BVV approach is that it is very malleable, 
and researchers can experiment with any of the formulations of  t s '  in (15) which 
they believe best fit their requirements. 
The BVV approach is also handy in that it does not affect the fundamental 
long-term properties of the New Keynesian model in (13)–(14). In particular, there is 
no long-term relationship between nominal and real variables, and all real variables 
are on their predetermined trend trajectories. Most importantly for our analysis, the ex-
change rate level is not uniquely defined in the steady state, as it depends on the his-
tory of shocks and the initial condition. It is this property that is the object of our 
attention in the next section. 
4. Inflation Targeting and Managed Floats 
In this section we develop an alternative specification of the UIP that enables 
modeling of informal (i.e., stochastic) exchange rate bands or (crawling) pegs co-
existing with IT. The specification introduces short-term deviations from the UIP, 
while preserving the UIP at long maturities. The short-term deviations are modeled 
as expectation errors that fluctuate according to the central bank’s intervention poli-
cy (with the country’s stock of reserves). We show how the modified UIP can be ca-
librated to keep the exchange rate within a stochastic band around a central parity 
and how it affects the short and long-term model properties. 
4.1 Requirements 
While instrumental in increasing exchange rate persistence, the BVV (or BKL) 
approach cannot be used for modeling exchange rate corridors or pegs. First,  no 
value of ȕ in (15) gives a formulation consistent with a fixed exchange rate. Figure 4 
plots the unconditional standard deviation of the exchange rate implied by the model 
of Section 3 (and its calibration in terms of parameters and shock standard errors) for 
different values of ȕ.
11 The power of ȕ to limit exchange rate volatility is small; for 
instance, the standard deviation of the exchange rate for ȕ = 1 is still about 90 % of 
that implied by the model with pure UIP (ȕ = 0). Moreover, the relationship between 
11 In this experiment the model economy is subjected to shocks drawn randomly from their covariance ma-
trix implied by the data and the current model. This is done for several values of  (01) , E   The variance of 
the exchange rate error term has been set to zero, but the covariance matrix of the error terms does not 
change with different ȕ. When calibrated to a particular country, each value of ȕ should be associated with 
a different covariance matrix of shocks. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 3-4                                177 
exchange rate volatility and ȕ is not monotonic, making it difficult to calibrate ȕ ac-
cording to some desired exchange rate volatility. Finally, it is difficult to motivate 
BVV by reference to central bank behavior limiting exchange rate fluctuations. 
We therefore propose an alternative UIP modification with the following pro-
perties: (i) pure UIP holds at long horizons as well as in the steady state, as in BVV 
and as is consistent with empirical research on the UIP; (ii) it allows for modeling of 
an exchange rate (crawling) peg; (iii) it can be used to limit the exchange rate vola-
tility around a central parity according to pre-defined stochastic bands; (iv) it can be 
linked to a systematic exchange rate management policy of a central bank. 
A formulation satisfying these requirements could be used to model a variety 
of exchange rate regimes, ranging from pure floats, through informal exchange rate 
bands, to exchange rate (crawling) pegs. At the same time, it would be consistent 
with  the empirical  finding  that  the pure  UIP  discrepancies  are  due  to  expectation 
errors that disappear at long horizons, as well as having good behavioral foundations. 
4.2 Exchange Rate Parity 
As a first step in deriving the modified UIP, we introduce the concept of ex-
change rate parity. This is the level (or trajectory) of the exchange rate that is con-
sistent with the inflation targets and real exchange rate in the long term. In other 
words, it is the exchange rate trajectory that the central bank needs to maintain on 
average if it wants to keep inflation on target in the long term: 
                                                     1
P
t tt ss s    '                                                     (19) 
or                      1
PP
t tt ss s    '                                                      (20) 
In both definitions, the exchange rate parity is implied by extrapolating from 
the past exchange (parity) rate using the economy’s fundamentals ( t z ' ) and long- 
-term inflation differentials (
*
tt S S  ). We call these levels parity because they are im-
plied by relative PPP (adjusted for the real exchange rate trend). 
Both formulations of the parity level are consistent with achieving inflation tar-
gets, but they have different policy implications. In (19), the trajectory of the parity 
level is not predetermined and moves with the exchange rate level. Its slope, how-
ever, is determined at any point in time. Such a parity formulation has little direct 
FIGURE 4  Exchange Rate Volatility and ȕ (common model with BVV extension of the UIP) 
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practical use in terms of modeling central bank policies. It would require a central 
bank to let the exchange rate move within a band around the parity in one period, and 
then level shift the parity for the next period according to the actual exchange rate 
situation. While such patterns have been observed in countries with crawling band re-
gimes in the past (e.g., Israel and Poland in the 1990s), level shifts in the parity have 
occurred very infrequently. 
In (20), on the other hand, the whole trajectory of the parity level is predeter-
mined, which is  more  appropriate  for  modeling  the central  parities  of  continuous 
exchange rate corridors. In the rest of the text and simulations we will use the parity 
definition in (20), but our results are robust to using (19) too. 
4.3 Modified UIP 
Our modified UIP is based on the following correction term, which is sub-
tracted from the exchange rate expectations in the pure UIP equation: 
               01 )
1
P





«» ¬¼     ¢ 

                    (21) 
The correction reduces (increases) exchange rate expectations if the current 
level of the exchange rate is above (below) the exchange rate parity level. This cor-
rection introduces a direct effect of long-term fundamentals on future exchange rate 
expectations. For instance, if the exchange rate appreciates by more than what is im-
plied by the long-term fundamentals (that is,  >
P
tt s s ), the rational expectations of the fu-
ture exchange rate are corrected downward, reflecting the unsustainable movement.
12 
When subtracting this term from the exchange rate expectation in pure UIP, 
we arrive at the following UIP modification:  
1 () 4 tt tt t ss c o r ri i

           (22) 
      1 1( ) 4
P
tt t t ss i i EE

                                   (23) 
    01 E             (24) 
As seen from (23), the correction term reduces the sensitivity of the exchange 
rate to the interest rate differential, both current and future. This reduces the exchan-
ge rate jumpiness (increases its persistence), while also allowing for controlling of 
exchange rate volatility, as we will explain below. This behavior is consistent with 
the literature (e.g., (Krugman, 1991)) which finds that the exchange rate bands alter 
the sensitivity of the exchange rate to the interest rate differential at all points, not 
only in the immediate neighborhood of the bands. 
The modified UIP (23) satisfies our requirements when used in the New Key-
nesian model of Section III in place of (6). First, the correction disappears at long 
horizons, because 
P
t tt t ss s s   '  '  and  s s '  ' along the balanced growth path by 
the construction  of  the model  in  Section  3.  This  is  best  seen  from  the stationary 
version of (25):  
12 Note that introducing this effect just reinforces the overall effect of long-term fundamentals on exchange 
rate movements: even in the model with pure UIP the exchange rate always grows at  t s '  along the ba-
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 1 () 1 ( ) 4 t tt t t t ss s i i s EE

 '  '  ' '                          (25) 
Second, (23) harbors a crawling peg as a special case of ȕ = 1 Then, 
P
tt s s    at 
all times, which can be used to model both hard and crawling pegs, depending on 
the trajectory of 
P
t s . Because the parity 
P
t s  is a trajectory given by assumptions about 
the real exchange rate trend and inflation targets, an appropriate choice of inflation 
targets can give it any shape, including that of a hard peg. The appendix deals with 
the hard peg case in more detail. 
Third, the value of ȕ can be used to limit the exchange rate volatility within 
given (stochastic) bands around a central parity. For any ȕ > 0 (23) and (21) gua-
rantee that the exchange rate will always be at the parity level in the steady state. 
Also, outside the steady state, the exchange rate is more stable around the parity rate 
of 
P
t s  with higher ȕ. Figure 5 demonstrates this using stochastic simulations of the full 
model: the unconditional volatility of the exchange rate falls with higher ȕ. Although 
we cannot prove it formally, we checked that this relationship is monotonic also for 
a range  of  other  model  parameterizations.  The parameter  ȕ t hus  plays  the role  of 
a weight measuring the exchange rate flexibility in the particular exchange rate re-
gime. 
Fourth, the modified UIP can be derived from the systematic exchange rate 
management policy of a central bank. It is enough to assume that exchange rate ex-
pectations depend on the level of the country’s foreign exchange reserves and to 
choose the appropriate functional form for this relationship corresponding to (21). Al-
ternatively,  we  can  assume  that  the rate  at  which  the economy  borrows  on  inter-
national financial markets depends on the level of foreign exchange reserves (say, as 
coverage for a current account deficit), e.g.,     0 tt iF x II
c     where  Fx  refers to 
the central bank’s foreign exchange rate reserves. Assuming further a particularly sim-
ple functional form of    log( ) tt t t t FxF x F xf x fx I       , we get the following UIP con-
dition dependent on the fluctuations of foreign exchange reserves around their long- 
-term (steady-state) optimal level:  
                                             1 tt t t t t s si i f x fx
 §·
¨¸  ©¹                          (26) 
FIGURE 5  Exchange Rate Volatility (deviation from the parity) and ȕ (new UIP) 
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Finally, assume that the central bank adjusts the reserves in order to limit 
the deviations of the exchange rate changes from the parity according to the rule:  
       ()
P
tt t t fxs s fx O                                                 (27) 
By substituting this rule into (26), we arrive at (23), with  (1 ) OE E   .
13  
Although a partial equilibrium, this derivation is very malleable and does not 
depend on many unrealistic assumptions. It can also easily be incorporated into a ge-
neral equilibrium model.
14 However, because we only need the UIP in (23) in a re-
duced form, we are not tied to a particular behavioral motivation. For instance, we 
could derive a similar reduced-form UIP if we assumed that the central bank was 
concerned about sterilization costs when adjusting the level of reserves in response to 
exchange rate deviations, such as 
1 () tt t t t t t t fx s s s s i i fx ON
 §·
¨¸  ©¹   '  '     
In the special case of O N    this rule also gives rise to (23).  
4.4 Modeling of Exchange Rate Corridors 
Using the modified UIP in the canonical NK model of Section 3 allows for 
modeling of hybrid IT regimes that use passive exchange rate management in ad-
dition to interest rate changes when targeting inflation. By passive exchange rate ma-
nagement we refer to situations where the central bank limits exchange rate volatility 
through some kind of band, but does not manipulate the band actively in order to 
target inflation (this is achieved by interest rates). In contrast, the case of active ex-
change rate management, which manipulates the exchange rate as an instrument in 
targeting inflation, is addressed in the next section. 
The modified UIP can model informal exchange rate bands coexisting with 
IT, but cannot be used for explicit (pre-announced) bands. In our linear model the ex-
change rate flexibility and bands refer to stochastic behavior of the exchange rate (or 
its rate of change), so that the exchange rate fluctuations are contained within bands 
with a certain probability. Nothing prevents the exchange rate from escaping the bands 
should a relatively large shock hit the economy. When reached, the bands are not de-
fended by any special operations. We call such bands informal (or implicit), as op-
posed to explicit or formally announced bands, which presume discreet ad hoc cen-
tral bank operations to defend the bands when the exchange rate is in their vicinity. 
In the linear model we have no capacity to model explicit bands and their disci-
plining effects on exchange rate behavior (e.g., (Krugman, 1991)). Unlike explicit 
bands, implicit bands arise only as a result of systematic central bank behavior that 
is the same irrespective of the exchange rate position relative to the bands (such as 
that described in (27)). 
13 N o te  that  when  the central  bank  adjusts  its  reserves  in  response  to  exchange  rate  growth,  such  as
() t tt t fx s s fx O   '  '  one obtains the modified UIP consistent with the “jumping” definition of the ex-
change rate parity in (19). 
14 (Ho, 2004) is an example of a general equilibrium analysis of intervention, although in a flexible price 
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4.4.1 Calibration 
Our approach is handy in that parameter ȕ serves as an index of exchange rate 
flexibility and can be calibrated to fit the width of an informal exchange rate corridor. 
Free floats and pegs arise as special cases of ȕ = 0 and 1, respectively. For informal 
bands, ȕ can be chosen according to the relationship between the unconditional vola-
tility of the exchange rate deviation from the parity and ȕ, such as in Figure 5. For 
instance,  given  the calibration  of  the shock  standard  errors  in o u r  m odel  (not  re-
ported), ȕ = 0.5 implies that the exchange rate will, with 67% (95%) probability, be 
within a band around 0.3 % (0.6 %) wide.  
In practice, the calibration of ȕ using the information in Figure 5 can be com-
plicated  by  the need  to  know  the standard  errors  of  the model  structural  shocks. 
Typically, the standard errors are not known in advance and are estimated (say, by 
maximum likelihood in a Kalman filter) knowing the full model structure, including 
the value of ȕ. If the data allow, the standard errors and ȕ can be estimated jointly. 
When  the data  are  not  informative,  an iterative  procedure  can  be  used  in  which 
an initial value of ȕ is used to estimate the standard errors of the model shocks. The re-
sulting ȕ-exchange rate volatility relationship (such as in Figure 5) is then used to 
modify ȕ and so forth. 
4.4.2 Model Properties 
Our UIP modification substantially alters both the steady state and transition 
model properties when compared to the models with either pure UIP or BVV formu-
lations. 
Steady State Properties 
First, the exchange rate in our model does not follow a random walk in the steady 
state; it always ends up at the pre-determined parity level 
P
t s  as the UIP correction (21) 
disappears. This is in contrast to the pure UIP and BVV approaches, where the steady 
state exchange rate level depends on the initial conditions and the history of shocks. 
Second, the price level is also predetermined in the steady state, which means 
that inflation targeting becomes price level targeting. This follows from observing 
that when the nominal and real exchange rates are on their predetermined trajectories, 
the price level must be at the level implied by the initial condition and the sequence 
of inflation targets.  
Third, the other steady state properties in (13) and (14) remain intact, except 
that the central bank loses its target autonomy. As long as it is committed to a par-
ticular exchange rate parity s
P, it can no longer choose its inflation target ʌ
T freely. In 
other words, its choice of parity and inflation target is constrained by the condition:  
T P z s S S
  '  '  
This condition is especially binding if the country chooses a fixed exchange 
rate. Then, its inflation (and the target) in the long term is given by 
* T z S S  '  . 
Transition Properties 
The exchange rate corridor also affects the impulse responses. We illustrate 
this using the output gap shock by varying ȕ and thus changing the width of the in-
formal exchange rate band. Other shocks yield similar conclusions.
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The response of output to a demand shock is not much affected by the dif-
ferent exchange rate corridors, unlike those of inflation and the policy variables, in-
cluding interest and exchange rates, and interventions. Figure 6 shows the impulse 
responses of key variables following the demand shock for several values of ȕ in-
cluding the extreme cases of an exchange rate float and (crawling) peg. 
Inflation and interest rates fluctuate much more with narrower exchange rate 
corridors.  This  is  a result  of  the price-level-targeting  property.  Because  the price 
level  is  predetermined  in  the steady  state,  a temporary  inflation  increase  above 
the target has to be compensated by an inflation decrease below the target of an equal 
magnitude. As inflation fluctuates around the target, so do interest rates around their 
steady state level. In contrast, a pure float scenario allows for a smooth landing for 
both inflation and interest rates.  
Inflation is contained faster with wider exchange rate bands (low values of ȕ), 
as nominal and real exchange rates are allowed to appreciate more in response to 
an interest rate hike. As a consequence, the initial interest rate reaction is smaller 
with wider bands than with narrower ones. For narrower bands, inflation continues to 
build up for some time after the shock, before the stabilization forces of higher real 
interest (and exchange) rates are finally able to contain it. 
Exchange rate volatility is clearly contained within the corridors and the ex-
change rate always returns to the baseline for any positive value of ȕ. This is in con-
trast to a free float (ȕ = 0, i.e., pure UIP), when the exchange rate does not revert to 
the baseline (parity) level. It falls below the control trajectory for a given real ex-
change rate path, because the shock raises the price level in the long term. 
Finally, the figure also displays the central bank interventions (expressed in 
interest rate equivalents) that are needed to sustain the corridor. The central bank has 
FIGURE 6  Demand Shock: Corridors and Varying ȕ 
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to violate the UIP at short horizons if it simultaneously wants to retain policy in-
dependence (in terms of interest rates targeting inflation) and limit the exchange rate 
fluctuations. In order to violate the UIP at short horizons the central bank has to 
engage in perpetual interventions. Thanks to the reduced-form formulation of the UIP 
in (23), interventions are a residual variable of our system. From (21) and (23) the in-
terventions  are  proportional  to  the value  of  the correction  term  corr a p p lied  to 
the model-consistent expectations. This  is understandable,  because  it  is  precisely 
this term that violates the pure UIP.  
With the demand shock, the central bank has to intervene when a corridor is in 
place (ȕ > 0). It intervenes at first by buying foreign exchange, as the interest rate 
reaction is larger than that required by a free float, and later by selling foreign ex-
change, when the interest rate response falls below that of the free float. 
5. Hybrid Inflation Targeting: Exchange and Interest Rate Corridors 
The approach of the previous section can be generalized to provide for cases 
where  the central  bank  has  imperfect  control  over  both  the exchange  rate  and 
the interest rate. In other words, both the exchange rate and the interest rate move in 
probabilistic corridors determined by the central bank’s systematic behavior. Such 
generalization is most relevant for intermediate regimes that are experimenting with 
introducing inflation as an intermediate variable, while still engaged in exchange 
rate management, and replacing exchange rates with interest rates as instruments. 
Our strategy allows for imperfect control over market interest rates, which is a com-
mon situation in regimes whose monetary programs involve targeting monetary ag-
gregates through either banking reserves or the monetary base as operational targets, 
and whose markets may not be developed enough to enable effective interest rate 
targeting. 
The cornerstone of our generalized modeling strategy is symmetric treatment 
of both the exchange rate and the interest rate in a similar way as we treated the ex-
change rate in Section 4. Each is assumed to evolve around a policy-defined parity 
level that is made consistent with achieving the inflation target and the economy’s 
long-term trends using Taylor-type rules. The following are the modified equations 
(which replace equations (4) and (6) of the original model in Section 3): 
ˆ
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In the modified system, 
P
t s  does not represent the parity level as before, but a po-
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using a Taylor-type rule. We can afford this small inconsistency in our notation be-
cause conceptually these terms are the same, and our previous exposition arises as 
a special case of this general system. The equations introduce other new variables: 
P i  denotes the policy level of interest rates (equivalent to that for exchange rates), and 
ˆ s  and ˆ i  are the measures of the actual deviation of the exchange rate and the interest 
rate from their policy levels. 
Equations (28) and (29) represent the modified UIP equation introduced in 
the previous section – collapsing to (25) for  0 J   , while equations (30) and (31) mo-
dify the market interest rate behavior (replacing equation (4)) using the same prin-
ciple. 
The policy levels for both the exchange rate and the interest rate (
P
t s  
P
t i ) move 
according to Taylor rules targeting inflation (the autoregressive smoothing terms of 
0.8 are not displayed for the sake of exposition).
16 In the long term, they both return 
to the parity levels consistent with the inflation targets and long-term real economic 
trends. The parameters Ȗ and Į (calibrated to 2 and 2.5, respectively) control the short- 
-term sensitivity of the policy levels to the deviation of inflation from the target. Va-
rious other Taylor formulations are possible, including those with expected future 
deviations of inflation from the target or with output gaps. 
The actual (market) values of the exchange rate and the interest rate converge 
to the policy levels (i.e.,  0 ˆ ˆ s,i   ), but in the short term move around the policy levels 
to a degree parameterized between 0 and 1 using parameters ȕ and Ȥ. When the re-
spective parameter reaches 1, the central bank controls the market rate perfectly at 
the desired policy level; in the other extreme, the rate is determined freely by market 
forces – by the uncovered interest rate parity condition. Note that the models of Sec-
tions 3 and 4 assumed the central bank had perfect control over market interest rates, 
hence it was used in place of 
P
t i   
Finally, the variable  b measures the extent to which the UIP condition is vio-
lated (expressed in %), and is an indicator of the intervention volumes necessary to 
maintain the interest rate and exchange rate simultaneously at their desired levels. 
Violating the arbitrage condition is only possible if there is an infinite supply of in-
struments  –  in  this  case  the central  bank  engages  in  permanent  interventions  by 
buying  or  selling  short-term  instruments  to  roll  the situation  over  (e.g.,  sterilized 
interventions in case of interest rate sensitive capital inflows in fixed exchange rate 
economies). 
5.1 Interpreting ȕ and Ȥ
The parameters can be understood as putting informal corridors in place for 
both the exchange rate and the interest rate, whose width (in terms of volatility) is 
determined on the basis of the model parameterization and the shock standard errors. 
The parameters represent various (unspecified) institutional factors that may 
prevent the central bank from enforcing the desired policy levels. For instance, the cen-
tral bank may introduce an informal exchange rate corridor around the policy tra-
16 A similar Taylor type rule for the exchange rate was used and estimated by Parrado (2004b) for Sin-
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jectory in order to promote market development and facilitate greater exchange rate 
flexibility later on. On the other hand, central banks (especially those with nascent 
money markets) may not be able to limit the volatility of money market interest 
rates beyond a certain threshold, given by the institutional characteristics of the mar-
ket. 
The requirement of model stability puts some constraints on the possible com-
binations of the two parameter values. For instance, while it is possible that the ex-
change rate and/or the interest rate are forced to be on their policy level trajectories 
( 1 E F    ), it is not possible for them both to be jointly set loose from these levels 
( 0 E F    ), as there would be no mechanism stabilizing the model (and inflation) in 
the face of a shock. Note also that when the monetary authority has no control over 
the exchange (interest) rate, i.e.,  0( 0 ) EF    , then its control over the interest (ex-
change) rate is necessarily perfect; in other words, the value of  () FE becomes irre-
levant. 
The most empirically relevant cases are the following: 
 –  1 E F    ; the central bank practices a hard peg exchange rate regime (at a level 
made consistent with the inflation target and economic fundamentals), but simul-
taneously manipulates market interest rates (either directly or through a reserve- 
-based system) in order to achieve the targeted rate of inflation, as in Section 3. 
As a result of violating the market determination of both rates, the bank almost 
permanently intervenes. In the special case where  0 J z , the exchange rate peg 
moves in response to deviations of inflation from the target. 
 –  01 , E F    ; the most standard inflation targeting case. The central bank exer-
cises perfect control over money market interest rates as its only instrument for 
targeting inflation, and the exchange rate is freely floated. 
 –  (01), =1 , EF  ; the central bank exercises perfect control over money market in-
terest rates as its main instrument for targeting inflation, but also imposes an in-
formal corridor on its exchange rate, whose central parity is consistent with 
the target and economic fundamentals, as in Section 4. When  0 J z , the center of 
the corridor (i.e., the exchange rate parity) moves in response to deviations of 
inflation from the target. This situation prevails in several IT regimes (e.g., Hun-
gary), but is also typical of the early stages of IT introduction. 
 –  (0 1) (0 1) ,, , EF  ; the central bank does not have perfect control over money 
market interest rates, but at the same time allows some exchange rate flexibility. 
This situation prevails in some intermediate regimes transiting to greater exchan-
ge rate flexibility, but lacking the proper infrastructure to use other instruments – 
the exchange rate thus continues to play the role of instrument too. 
 –  1( 0 1 ) ,, EF    the central bank uses the exchange rate as its main instrument for 
targeting inflation, while market interest rates are allowed to move in a more or 
less loose corridor. This situation may arise in very small open economies with 
a dominant exchange rate channel (e.g., Singapore or New Zealand in the early 
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5.2 Model Properties 
We will now examine the effects of varying parameters ȕ and Ȥ on the model 
properties. For brevity we illustrate them using the output gap shock, but the key 
findings are seen in other shocks too. 
5.2.1 Varying ȕ 
First, we run experiments changing the width of the exchange rate corridor by 
varying ȕ while keeping perfect interest rate control ( 1 F   ). The experiment is simi-
lar to the one in the previous section, except that the exchange rate parity (corridor) 
now moves actively in fighting inflation, thus aiding interest rate transmission (Fi-
gure 7).  
Some of the results are qualitatively similar to those in Section 4. Specifically, 
the responses of output and real interest rates are not much affected by changing 
the corridor width. Inflation is still contained faster with wider exchange rate bands 
(very low values of ȕ), despite the revaluation of the exchange rate corridor. With 
wider bands, nominal and real exchange rates are still allowed to appreciate more in 
response to an interest rate hike than is allowed by the appreciation of the band using 
the Taylor rule. As a consequence, the required interest rate reaction is still smaller 
with wider bands than with narrower ones. 
However, these results depend on how aggressively the central bank moves 
the exchange rate corridor in response to higher inflation. Figure 8, for instance, shows 
the same simulation, but with Ȗ in the exchange rate rule raised to 4 instead of 2. 
Now,  the exchange rate  reacts  by  more  than  is  implied  by  a pure float,  allowing 
the interest rates in the corridor scenarios to be more relaxed on average compared to 
the pure float scenario.  
Finally, there are also quantitative differences compared to Figure 6. For in-
stance, inflation and interest rates in Figure 7 do not rise as much with narrower cor-
FIGURE 7  Demand Shock: Changing Corridors and Varying ȕ 
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ridors as in Figure 6, because of the revaluation of the exchange rate corridor. Also 
the interventions, at least initially, are higher when revaluating the exchange rate cor-
ridor. This is more clearly seen in Figure 8, where the revaluation is higher. 
5.2.2 Varying Ȥ
Second, we experiment with changing the width of the interest rate corridor 
by varying Ȥ while keeping the exchange rate within the band implied by ȕ = 0.5. 
Figure 9 illustrates how varying Ȥ limits the unconditional volatility of the interest 
rate deviation from the desired policy level.
17 As with ȕ, this relationship is mono-
FIGURE 8  Demand Shock: Changing Corridors and Varying ȕ (Ȗ = 4) 
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FIGURE 9  Interest Rate Volatility (deviation from the policy level) and Ȥ (ȕ = 0.5) 




























Source: own calculation 
17 Note that this experiment actually contains two effects. In addition to changing the interest rate corridor 
(Ȥ), the exchange rate corridor width also moves, despite ȕ being constant, because different Ȥ imply dif-
ferent unconditional volatilities of the exchange rate. We would have to recalibrate ȕ for each value of Ȥ to 
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tonic for plausible parameterizations and can be used in calibrating Ȥ to set the width 
of the interest rate corridor. 
Figure 10 shows the impulse responses after a demand shock for different 
values of Ȥ. In contrast to the exchange rate corridor experiments, the profiles for 
the most important variables, such as inflation, the exchange rate, and output, are not 
much affected by the interest rate corridor width.  
Unlike most other variables, market interest rates are much affected by the width 
of the interest rate corridor. Interest rates even fall below the baseline when the cen-
tral bank has little control over them. This is because in such situations market in-
terest rates are determined purely by UIP arbitrage. Hence, few or no interventions 
are needed to support the corridor. And as the markets expect the exchange rate pa-
rity to tighten gradually (following the Taylor type rule), an inflow of capital brings 
market rates down. As a result of the lower interest rates, inflation is higher with 
wider interest rate corridors. 
The experiment with an interest rate corridor points to the potential pitfalls of 
targeting inflation using the exchange rate as the only instrument. Inflation is higher 
with a wider corridor, as the real interest rate and exchange rate channels go against 
each other. The effect of this clash depends on the relative strength of the two chan-
nels in affecting output. Our baseline calibration (Figure 10) assigns a relatively low 
weight to the real interest rate channel (in line with the stylized emerging market ca-
libration of Section 3). As a result, the increase in inflation resulting from falling 
market rates is relatively small in Figure 10. However, Figure 11 shows the same 
experiment with the relative weights on the real interest rate and exchange rate in (1) 
reversed. The result is a marked increase in inflation and its volatility.  
In summary, the width of the interest and exchange rate corridors matters more 
for inflation and interest rates than for output. Moving the exchange rate corridor in 
FIGURE 10  Demand Shock: Corridors and Varying Ȥ (ȕ = 0.5) 
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response to inflation helps to contain inflation faster and also allows for looser in-
terest rates. Even then, though, a wider exchange rate corridor may be preferred (in 
terms of containing inflation) if the central bank is not able to move the corridor ag-
gressively enough. Inflation is also contained faster when the control over market 
interest rates is tighter. Targeting inflation using the exchange rate as the only instru-
ment risks counter-productive side effects, as the interest rate channel may work 
against the stabilization effects of the exchange rate. 
6. Conclusions 
We analyze the modeling implications of hybrid IT regimes that coexist with 
exchange rate management. We do so in the framework of a reduced-form New Key-
nesian model of monetary transmission. Our approach is new in modeling interest 
and exchange rates as independent instruments (operational variables) in targeting 
inflation, as opposed to using only interest rates to target both inflation and the ex-
change rate as intermediate objectives. 
The modeling of such hybrid regimes requires an adjustment to the UIP con-
dition which affects exchange rate expectations and reduces the sensitivity of the ex-
change rate to interest rate differentials. We introduce a UIP modification that can be 
linked to the foreign exchange interventions of a central bank. We show how it can 
be used to model (informal) exchange rate bands, i.e., stochastic bands that are not 
explicitly announced and defended by other means than a systematic intervention po-
licy. We also extend the analysis to other hybrid regimes with imperfect control over 
interest rates. 
The main contribution of our paper is a new approach to modeling informal 
exchange rate bands in the class of reduced-form small open economy models. This 
approach is thus suitable for modeling of IT countries that keep their exchange rates 
in informal bands as well as countries that are at an intermediate stage of transition 
FIGURE 11  Demand Shock: Corridors and Varying Ȥ (ȕ = 0.5, a2 = 0.2, a3 = 0.1) 
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from a fixed (or strongly managed) exchange rate regime to a more flexible one with 
elements of IT. With certain caveats, the approach can also be used for countries that 
are transiting from free float inflation targeting to an exchange rate based system, e.g. 
ERM II. 
Although we stay away from policy or country lessons, our analysis points to 
several important properties of hybrid IT regimes:  
 – An exchange rate corridor introduces large fluctuations of interest and inflation 
rates around their steady state (target) values, because such a regime resembles 
price level targeting.  
 – Inflation is contained faster with a wider exchange rate corridor, as in that case 
the interest rate transmission is most effective by also working through the ex-
change rate channel. However, narrower corridors can result in lower inflation and 
interest rates if the central bank moves the corridor aggressively in response to 
future inflation.  
 – Targeting inflation using the exchange rate as the only instrument (letting market 
interest rates adjust) risks counter-productive side effects, as the interest rate chan-
nel may work against the stabilization effects of the exchange rate. 
 – Finally, the degree of control over interest and exchange rates matters more for 
inflation, interest rates, and interventions than for output. 
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APPENDIX
Inflation Targeting and Exchange Rate Peg 
Modeling of the transmission mechanism when an exchange rate peg coexists 
with elements of inflation targeting has to satisfactorily address the following issues: 
(i) the ability of a central bank to set interest rates independently of interest rate pari-
ty, and (ii) the independence of the monetary authority to choose its inflation target. 
The first issue is that of monetary policy instrument independence when the ex-
change rate is fixed, which under usual circumstances delegates m o n etary policy 
conduct  to  the outside  world  (a  reference  country).  Under  these  normal  circum-
stances,  the sheer  force  of  international  arbitrage  (under  perfect  capital  mobility) 
would lead to convergence of nominal interest rates to those of the main trading 
partners (subject to a risk premium). The management of interest rates would thus lie 
outside  the influence  of  the central  bank.  However,  the monetary  authority  may 
achieve independence if it is willing to work against the forces of international ar-
bitrage and provide sufficient liquidity to keep interest rates at any level it considers 
fit (to achieve the inflation target, for instance). 
The issue essentially boils down to how to model the exchange rate-interest 
rate link in such cases. Although the central bank may in theory attempt to control 
the entire yield curve by controlling the supply of instruments with relevant matu-
rities, in practice it controls (as an instrument) only short-run interest rates, while 
the long rates are determined by the market. 
In this institutional setting, the key modeling challenge is how to make long 
interest rates follow foreign rates, when short-run rates are set independently and UIP 
arbitrage does not hold at short maturities. 
The virtue of the UIP condition is that if the country credibly fixes its exchan-
ge rate, this alone is sufficient to guarantee that domestic yields follow foreign yields 
at long maturities. To see this, let us return to the uncovered interest rate parity equa-
tion (6). Because we are interested in the case of a credible peg, we assume the pre-
mium away from now on without any loss in generality.
18 Relationship (6) holds for 
long maturities as well, and by iterating the equation forward we obtain:  
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where sT is the expected exchange rate at some distant date T and I is the appropriate 
long-run interest rate between times t and T (valid for T – t + 1 quarterly periods and 
quoted in annual terms). If such relationships held with a credibly fixed exchange 
rate ( tt s s, T   , premium is zero), both short and long-run rates in the domestic eco-
nomy would be determined by foreign rates:  
TT
tt t t ii I I
      
18 A convenient assumption only. As long as forward exchange rates are unbiased predictors of future ex-
change rates, the risk premium is zero. In later sections we in fact derive a formula for modeling a risk 
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Hence, the UIP condition alone guarantees the equalization of yields on long 
securities when the monetary authority passively keeps the exchange rate peg. 
When, on the other hand, the monetary authority controls its short-run nomi-
nal rates in violation of UIP, equalization of long yields has to be achieved by other 
means than a simple UIP condition. This is done by a particular combination of three 
elements: an interest rate rule, setting of the inflation target, and real interest rate arbi-
trage at long horizons. 
The interest rate rule determines the interest rate at long horizons. To see this, 
consider a stylized interest rate rule, such as that in (4):  
         ()
TAR
tt t ii DS S                                                 (33) 
  tt ir S   
Interest rates react to a deviation of inflation ʌt from the target ʌt. Such a rule 
implies that domestic long interest rates are:  
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t P  and 
TT A R
t P
  are time t expectations of the differences in the price levels be-
tween T and t, based on the expectations of actual and target inflation rates, respec-
tively. 
To inspect how domestic long rates relate to foreign long interest rates, the sett-
ing of the target (influencing the expected price level  P) and the determination of 
the long-run level of nominal (and hence real) interest rates have to be made more 
explicit. 
The choice of the target is not independent, however, if the monetary autho-
rity wishes to control inflation and keep the exchange rate fixed; the long-run pro-
perties of the economy constrain it. The monetary authority cannot aspire to change 
real variables in the long run, hence the real exchange rate is exogenous to it. Assume 
a particular long-run trajectory of real exchange rates  t z , such that  
    lim t tt t t s pp z

of                                                        (34) 
  lim t ttt t s z S S

of'  '  
Then, domestic inflation is exogenous to the monetary authority as long as it 
fixes  (ǻ 0) tt ss   , and its stationary value is determined by the long-run depreciation 
of the real exchange rate and foreign inflation,  
                                                 
TAR
t t t z S S S
    '                                                   (35) 
The inflation target then has to be set in accordance with the stationary level 
of inflation, implying for the expected change in price between periods T and t based 
on the inflation target:  ()
TT A R T TT
Tt tt tt PP zz ZZ




  approaches the expected change in the actual price level: 
TT A R T
Tt t lim P P

of   . The long enough interest rates are then given as:  
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Furthermore, the stationary values of nominal (and real) interest rates are also 
exogenous  to  monetary  policy.
19 T h e y  a r e  linked  to  foreign  rates  by  assuming 
equalization of real returns in the long run. 
The real interest rate parity for long-run trends has:  
             tt t zrr
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Going back to (36), the returns on long instruments are equalized at long enough 
horizons, as implied by international arbitrage:  
lim lim
TT
tt TT I I

of of    
Hence, with a fixed exchange rate, the system of equations (35), (33), and (37), 
















and a provision guaranteeing the satisfaction of (34) provide both management of 
short-run interest rates as well as alignment of the implied long rates along their 
foreign benchmark. The provision guaranteeing the satisfaction of (34) comes from 
the rest of the model in Section 3. 
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